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Abstract  
Whereas the number of paid overtime hours declined over the last decade, a different trend 
can be observed for unpaid overtime work in Germany. We look at the future consequences 
for overtime workers, and therefore investigate the investment character of working time. We 
examine whether unpaid extra hours induce a higher likelihood of promotion and pay rise, 
and whether they reduce the risk of losing the job. Using longitudinal micro data from the 
GSOEP for the years 1991 to 2002 we find significant positive effects of unpaid overtime 
work on future payoffs, but also a positive impact on the probability of job loss. Therefore, 
we find only partial evidence for the investment character of unpaid overtime. 
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1. Introduction 
Whereas the number of contractual hours and paid overtime hours declined over the last years 
and decades in Germany, a different trend can be observed for unpaid overtime work that 
refers to the time actually worked in excess of the contractual hours which is neither paid nor 
compensated with time-off. Both the incidence and the average amount of unpaid overtime 
rose during the past decade in Germany. This raises the question as to what causes workers to 
supply unpaid overtime hours, and, related to that, what are the future consequences for these 
workers. In this study we focus on the investment character of overtime which might be one 
of the possible explanations why individuals might want to work more than their contractual 
hours and even offer them to the company for free. The possible future benefits from working 
a greater amount of unpaid overtime hours are not only larger or more rapid salary increases 
and a higher probability of promotion, but also a lower probability of lay-off. Future payoffs 
from working overtime might be consistent with a variety of theories. It might be simply the 
cost aspect that leads firms to choose overtime workers to be promoted or retained in the firm, 
since they provide relatively cheap labor to their employer, in which case the payoffs might 
be interpreted as a reward in the sense of gift exchange. Unpaid overtime may also be 
interpreted as a means of a worker to signal productivity, motivation, or loyalty to the firm 
which separates workers on the base of this signal. Furthermore, the theory of deferred 
compensation and the human capital theory might also be used to predict a positive 
relationship between present working hours and future outcomes. The objective of this 
empirical study is to analyze whether working hours can be interpreted as an investment. We 
investigate whether the supply of unpaid extra hours leads to higher future wages, to higher 
promotion probabilities and to a lower risk of losing the job. 
 
Among the sparse literature on unpaid overtime work, there is almost none focusing on the 
investment character of extra hours. One of the recent studies on unpaid overtime is by Bell 
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and Hart (1998) who investigate economic reasons for employees undertaking unpaid 
overtime, and find that adjusting wages for unpaid hours leads to a decrease in returns to 
education, experience and tenure in Great Britain. In a continuative study Bell, Hart, Hübler, 
and Schwerdt (2000) show that in Germany less overtime and far less unpaid overtime is 
worked than in the UK and that the wage gap between the two countries is widened, when 
effective hourly wage rates (in consideration of unpaid overtime) are compared. Bauer and 
Zimmermann (1999) investigate the determinants of working overtime and overtime 
compensation in Germany and conclude that reducing overtime has no positive employment 
effect since mainly the highly skilled work overtime, which is in most cases either unpaid or 
compensated with leisure. Hübler (2002) analyzes the relationship between computer use at 
work and unpaid overtime and finds that managers who use a computer work more unpaid 
extra hours than others in Germany. This leads him to the conclusion that there are no 
effective computer wage differentials. 
 
A first evidence on the investment character of working hours in general is given by Bell and 
Freeman (2001). They compare actual working hours in the US and in Germany, and 
investigate the relationship between wage inequality and labor supply as well as the effect of 
actual working hours on future wages and promotion. They conclude that the greater hours 
worked by Americans can be explained in terms of forward-looking labor supply responses to 
differences in earnings inequality between the two countries. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 
(2003) also find empirical evidence for the forward looking labor supply model using British 
data. They show that the amount of overtime correlates with subsequent promotions in a 
significantly positive way. Supportive evidence for the investment character of unpaid extra 
hours is given by Pannenberg (2005) who investigates long-term effects of unpaid overtime 
work in West Germany. He finds that there are substantial long-term labor earnings effects 
associated with cumulative average unpaid overtime, which is evidence for the importance of 
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investing in current working hours beyond the standard work week to enhance real earnings 
prospects. He shows that workers with at least some incidence of unpaid overtime experience 
the highest wage growth. Anger (2005) analyzes the differences in unpaid overtime between 
East and West Germany, and investigates whether workers use unpaid extra hours as a signal 
of productivity so as to reduce the risk of losing their job. Empirical evidence is found for a 
positive relationship between the regional unemployment rate and the supply of unpaid 
overtime hours for male workers in West Germany.  
 
In this paper we test the forward looking labor supply model by investigating the relationship 
between unpaid overtime and promotion probability, wage growth, and the risk of 
unemployment. Using longitudinal micro data from the German Socio Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) for the years 1991 to 2002 we investigate whether a higher number of unpaid 
overtime hours involves a higher promotion probability, higher wages, and a lower risk of 
losing the job. Our results show a slightly higher probability of promotion and pay rise arising 
from unpaid overtime work for some worker groups. However, we also find that unpaid extra 
hours do not help to prevent future layoffs. Furthermore, other forms of overtime and 
contractual working hours are equally important for the determination of the probability of 
wage increase and promotion. This implies that there is only partial empirical evidence for a 
positive relationship between unpaid overtime and future payoffs. 
 
2. Data 
The data used in this study were made available by the German Socio-Economic Panel Study 
(GSOEP) at the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. The GSOEP is a 
representative longitudinal micro-database that provides a wide range of socio-economic 
information on private households in Germany. The yearly data were first collected from 
about 12,200 randomly selected adult respondents (in 6,000 families) in the former West 
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Germany in 1984. After German reunification in 1990, the GSOEP was extended by about 
4,500 persons (in 2,200 families) from the former East Germany. In the most recent wave, for 
2002, about 23,000 respondents were participating in the panel study. The GSOEP data is 
available as a public-use file containing 95% of the GSOEP sample, with some variables 
omitted for reasons of data protection (see Wagner et al., 1993, or for more detailed 
information, Haisken-DeNew and Frick, 2000). 
 
We use GSOEP data from 1991 to 2002 for male and female East and West German full-time 
employees aged between 20 and 65, excluding foreigners, civil servants, self-employed 
persons, and workers employed in the agricultural sector. Respondents with missing 
information on working hours and other crucial variables are dropped. We only use waves 
from 1991 on, since there was no information on East German workers before that year. Our 
unbalanced panel includes only those respondents who participate in at least two subsequent 
waves of the survey in order to control for individual unobserved heterogeneity. In total, the 
sub-sample consists of about 36,000 person-year observations, with 23,000 being male and 
13,000 female.  
 
The GSOEP provides detailed information on whether overtime is worked, on the amount of 
overtime hours per month and on overtime compensation.1 We take overtime hours per week 
and combine it with the information on overtime compensation in order to obtain the amount 
of unpaid overtime hours per week which is the crucial independent variable in our study. As 
dependent variables we use a dummy variable for wage increase, for being promoted, and for 
being laid off in the next year, within the next two years, and within the next three years. For 
                                                        
1
 The original questions in the GSOEP read as follows: ”Do you work overtime?” [Yes/No/Not applicable 
because I am self-employed]; “If you work overtime, is the work paid, compensated with time-off, or not 
compensated at all?” [Compensated with time-off/Partly paid, partly compensated with time-off/Paid/Not 
compensated at all]; “How was your situation with regards to overtime last month? Did you work overtime? If 
yes, how many hours?” [Yes, ____ hours/No]. 
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the wage information we use not only monthly gross earnings but also extra payments, such 
as Christmas bonus, holiday pay, income from profit sharing, and other bonuses. Extra 
payments have become increasingly important in recent years: Pierce (1999) finds that 
excluding extra payments from earnings tends to understate wage differentials. Since monthly 
labor income overstates the remuneration of workers whose weekly hours of work exceed 40, 
it would be appropriate to use the effective hourly wage rate by dividing gross earnings by 
actual working hours. However, hourly wages might understate the earnings of managers and 
other workers who work long hours. Furthermore, using a wage measure which includes 
actual working hours would cause an endogeneity problem, since actual weekly hours is the 
sum of the contractual work week plus overtime. Therefore, this study uses the wage rate 
obtained by dividing gross earnings by contractual hours plus paid overtime hours in order to 
prevent differences in paid working hours from distorting the estimates.  
 
The GSOEP does not provide direct information on promotions. Therefore, we construct a 
promotion dummy by combining information on intra-firm changes of workers with an 
evaluation of their new position. We consider a worker to be promoted if he changes his 
position within a firm and, in addition, self-rates his new position to be superior with respect 
to either his earnings or his tasks, or both. In our sample about 9% of the respondents have 
experienced a promotion during the considered period. The third dependent variable, 
experience of layoff, has been constructed by combining information on the ending of an 
employment and the stated reason for the job leave. Since the respondents provide the exact 
month in which they leave their job, it is possible to assign a dismissal to the correct year, 
which is also done with the information on promotion. In the estimations of the layoff 
probability, we also add regional unemployment rates to the covariates which are provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office in Germany and available on the state level. Furthermore, we 
include unemployment rates by employment office district (“Arbeitsamtbezirke”) that we 
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assign to the households according to their zip codes, which are collected since 1993.2 When 
estimating the layoff probability, we also include information on a person’s partner as well as 
on dependent children living in the household, since these characteristics might influence the 
layoff decision of a firm which has to take into account social criteria as agreed with the 
works council. In the estimations of the promotion probability, we include the information on 
whether a worker changed his job recently, whereas we exclude all job movers in the other 
estimations. Further independent variables in all estimations are the length of affiliation of a 
worker with his company, and whether he holds a temporary or a permanent job. All 
regressions include control variables such as education, experience, age, marital status, as 
well as firm size, occupation, industry, and year dummies (see Table A1 in the appendix). All 
regressions are run separately for men and women as well as for East and West German 
workers.3 
 
3. Overtime Work and Standard Working Hours 
The following graphs and tables show time trends for overtime work and contractual working 
hours, which differ substantially over the past decade. The contractual weekly working hours 
for the workers in our sample was about 38.7 hours in 1991 in West Germany, and it 
decreased during the 90ies to 38.4 hours in 2002. In the same period the standard work week 
in the East was reduced from 40.6 hours to 40 hours which lead to a slight narrowing of the 
gap between contractual working hours in the old and the new states. As can be seen in Graph 
1 the average contractual hours for all employees has shrunk from about 39.1 hours to 38.6  
hours per week and then increases slightly.  
                                                        
2
 Due to the sensitivity of the data analysis at the zip code level, all concerning analyses have been conducted at 
the German Institute for Economic Research (DIW), Berlin, under special data protection requirements. 
3
 The sub samples of men and women, and of East and West German workers might also be analyzed in one 
single regression. However, since the Chow test for structural change (Greene, 2000) revealed that the regression 
coefficients are significantly different in the above mentioned subsets of the data, analyses are conducted by 
running separate regressions. 
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Graph 1: Standard working hours and average overtime hours per week 
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Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-
employed persons excluded 
 
 
At the same time, there was a constant upward trend for the average amount of unpaid 
overtime, which reached about 0.8 weekly hours per worker, while the average amount of 
paid overtime work is only about 0.4 hours a week. Graph 2 shows that the importance of 
unpaid overtime is not only a German phenomenon.  
 
Graph 2: Paid and unpaid overtime incidence in the EU and the Accession Countries, 2001 (in % of employees) 
 
 
 
Source: European Commission (2003) 
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In almost all European countries, a substantial proportion of workers supplies extra hours for 
free. In countries as the UK or the Netherlands, even more than 15% of all employees worked 
unpaid overtime in 2002, while this incidence is only 7% in Germany. However, compared to 
the countries which have approximately the same incidence of overall overtime, as e.g. 
Sweden or Finland, there is a clearly higher percentage of uncompensated overtime in 
Germany. 
 
In Table 1 the proportion of employees working unpaid overtime is shown as well as the 
percentage of workers working paid overtime. It is striking that in the most recent year, 2002, 
the percentage of workers with unpaid overtime work is strictly higher than that of workers 
with paid overtime.  
 
Table 1: Incidence of Overtime (Unconditional and Conditional on Overtime Work, in %) 
 Unpaid Overtime Paid Overtime 
 
Employees working 
overtime 
(conditional) 
All employees 
(unconditional) 
Employees working 
overtime 
(conditional) 
All employees 
(unconditional) 
 Men Women Men Women Men Women Men Women 
1991 16.30  18.24  9.35  6.21  13.94  13.19  14.05  9.59  
1992 15.68  17.42  9.54  5.48  15.80  12.84  14.32  10.66  
1993 17.31  17.04  10.30  5.55  16.26  14.91  15.20  11.63  
1994 18.55  17.54  9.81  5.49  20.61  12.80  17.86  11.34  
1995 18.36  18.43  10.26  6.15  18.77  12.11  16.79  11.45  
1996 15.86  20.48  10.06  5.94  18.20  14.80  15.36  11.58  
1997 18.04  19.45  11.34  5.72  12.79  5.01  12.08  4.08  
1998 21.46  20.03  10.40  5.32  10.94  4.65  10.69  4.49  
1999 19.07  17.40  10.38  5.14  12.87  4.89  11.98  3.74  
2000 18.50  20.16  9.50  4.97  13.20  4.35  11.90  5.62  
2001 16.31  15.57  8.89  5.81  13.67  7.01  11.46  5.34  
2002 20.75  22.12  10.06  5.69  9.53  5.10  9.88  4.02  
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded 
 
 10
This is true for the incidence of unpaid overtime with the base of all employees 
(unconditional) as well as for the unpaid overtime incidence based on overtime workers only 
(conditional). The most striking differences occur among female employees with overtime 
work: While 22% of them supplied unpaid extra hours, only 5% of them worked paid 
overtime in 2002. However, looking at the first years of the sample period, it becomes 
obvious that this was not always the case. At the beginning of the 90ies there was a higher 
proportion of employees with paid overtime than with unpaid overtime both among male and 
female workers. The increase in the proportion of overtime workers with unpaid extra hours 
and the slight decrease in the percentage of overtime workers with paid hours lead to a 
substantial gap between paid and unpaid overtime incidence. It is striking that the difference 
between unpaid and paid overtime incidence is much bigger for workers with overtime work 
(conditional incidence). In order to have a more complete picture of the issue of overtime 
compensation it is necessary to compare unpaid overtime not only with paid overtime, but 
also with other forms of overtime compensation. Therefore, the development of the incidence 
of overtime compensation between 1991 and 2001 is given in table 2.  
 
Table 2: Shares of Overtime Compensation (in %) 
 Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
West Germany                      
Unpaid 17.7 15.9 20.9 22.8 21.2 22.0 22.1 22.6 19.7 17.7 16.3 22.2 
Paid 16.0 19.0 19.5 20.8 21.4 20.0 15.7 15.4 11.6 13.6 12.2 8.2 
Leisure 37.3 33.7 28.6 24.5 25.2 22.1 39.2 39.7 42.9 47.8 50.6 53.5 
partly paid/ leisure 29.1 31.5 30.6 31.9 32.1 35.8 23.0 22.2 25.7 20.8 20.9 16.1 
           
  
East Germany                      
Unpaid 23.0 21.2 18.9 21.6 23.5 21.8 22.4 19.1 20.1 17.7 15.5 17.6 
Paid 15.1 17.7 19.3 20.3 20.6 20.7 16.8 13.1 13.0 15.0 9.8 7.4 
Leisure 27.1 31.6 27.9 26.6 26.5 25.4 38.5 39.3 43.5 41.0 51.1 54.7 
partly paid/leisure 34.7 29.1 33.8 31.1 29.4 32.0 21.9 25.4 23.4 26.1 23.6 20.3 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees working overtime, age 20-65, civil servants and self-
employed persons excluded 
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Furthermore, it is important to have a closer look at the subgroups of workers, since it has 
already been shown by other studies that unpaid overtime is particularly worked by white 
collar workers (Bauer und Zimmermann, 1999). This is clearly because blue collar workers 
are more strongly affected by binding wages and working hours that result from collective 
bargaining. The percentage of white and blue collar workers supplying unpaid overtime as 
well as the amount of unpaid overtime hours are shown in Table 3. The incidence of unpaid 
overtime is far higher for white collar workers than for blue collar workers. As percentage of 
the total number of employees, almost 19 percent of the white collar workers work extra 
hours for free in 2002, while this incidence is only about 4 percent for blue collar workers. 
With regard to the amount of unpaid overtime, blue collar workers supply on average at least 
one unpaid overtime hour less per week. 
 
Table 3: Unpaid overtime incidence (in %) and amount of unpaid overtime hours (average weekly hours) 
 White collar worker Blue collar worker 
 Conditional on overtime work Unconditional Conditional on overtime work Unconditional 
Year Incidence Weekly hours Incidence Incidence Weekly hours Incidence 
1991 22.0% 1.5 18.4% 3.3% 0.2 1.6% 
1992 21.2% 1.2 18.6% 2.8% 0.1 1.9% 
1993 21.3% 1.2 18.0% 4.4% 0.2 3.1% 
1994 22.1% 1.4 17.6% 6.3% 0.4 3.6% 
1995 22.6% 1.4 18.4% 3.6% 0.1 2.6% 
1996 21.2% 1.4 18.0% 4.1% 0.2 3.0% 
1997 22.3% 1.3 19.2% 2.3% 0.1 1.5% 
1998 25.3% 1.7 19.2% 5.2% 0.3 3.4% 
1999 23.0% 1.6 17.6% 5.8% 0.4 3.7% 
2000 23.6% 1.6 17.0% 5.8% 0.4 3.9% 
2001 20.5% 1.3 16.7% 5.4% 0.2 4.3% 
2002 25.0% 1.6 18.6% 7.7% 0.4 4.4% 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded 
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4. Theoretical Considerations and Econometric Analysis  
The empirical evidence from the descriptive statistics above raises the question as to what 
drives people to supply an increasing number of unpaid hours. The growing importance of 
unpaid overtime work might be explained by a shift in working time preferences or stronger 
pressure from the firm side, but the reason might be more subtle, since overtime work might 
be unpaid today but lead to benefits in the future. Therefore, we investigate the investment 
character of unpaid overtime work and suggest a forward looking labor supply model (Bell 
and Freeman, 2001). Workers might regard unpaid overtime work as an investment and 
therefore voluntarily increase their labor supply for free in order to get a pay off in the future. 
The possible future benefits from working a greater amount of unpaid overtime hours are not 
only larger or more rapid salary increases (Pannenberg, 2005) and a higher probability of 
promotion (Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, 2003), but also a lower probability of lay-off.  
 
Several theories can be considered to generate the positive relationship between present 
working hours and future outcomes. In a simple cost minimization framework, the additional 
productive hours in form of overtime lead firms to choose overtime workers to be promoted 
or retained in the firm, since they provide relatively cheap labor. This is not only true for the 
case of unpaid overtime, but also for the case of paid overtime, since the firm can adjust labor 
at the inner margin by the use of overtime, and therefore save fix or sunk cost that would arise 
in the case of new hires. Higher future wages for overtime workers might be interpreted as a 
reward in the sense of gift exchange (Akerlof, 1984). In addition, the human capital theory is 
capable of treating working hours as investment. Assuming that overtime hours are used to 
acquire specific human capital (Booth et al., 2003), the human capital model can explain why 
they yield a return later on. Another explanation is provided by the literature of deferred 
compensation (Lazear, 1979), which deals with long-term worker-employer relationships, 
where measuring output is difficult. In order to encourage higher worker effort, optimal 
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compensation contracts are structured in a way that workers are paid below their marginal 
revenue product during the early part of their career and above their productivity later on. 
 
Lastly, the investment character of working time is consistent with the signaling theory, with 
unpaid overtime serving as signal of productivity, motivation, or loyalty to the employer. The 
signaling model by Spence (1973) was originally applied to the problem of asymmetric 
information in the job recruiting process. However, it might be extended to the post hiring 
period, if monitoring is difficult and the firm has no full information on worker productivity. 
The information asymmetry might lead to decisions on promotions, pay rises, and layoffs 
being on the basis of unpaid overtime or other characteristics, which are easier to observe than 
productivity. Workers might want to work longer hours and provide them even for free in 
order to increase the probability of pay rise and promotion, and to decrease the probability of 
being laid off. An equivalent reasoning is found in rat-race models (Landers, Rebitzer, and 
Taylor, 1996), where unequal outcome in success versus failure provokes a positive 
relationship between future pay off and current effort.  
 
Suggesting the forward looking labor supply model, we investigate the effect of unpaid 
overtime work on possible future outcomes, which are pay rise, promotion, and job loss. We 
estimate the effect of unpaid overtime hours on the probability of promotion, pay rise, and 
layoff by using a model of the following structure (Greene 2000):  
ititititi ovxy εγβα +++=+ ''* 1, ,           (1) 
where * 1, +tiy  is the latent propensity to get a payoff of the individual i in the future t+1, xit is a 
vector of individual and employer characteristics, and ovit the weekly unpaid overtime hours 
worked by the individual at time t. αi is the individual specific effect, β and γ are parameters 
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to be estimated, and εit denotes the error term which is distributed with mean 0 and variance 
σε
2
. As * 1, +tiy  is a latent variable, it is not observable. What one observes is 
otherwise
yif
y titi
0
0
1 * 1,
1,
>



=
+
+             (2) 
Assuming an underlying logistic distribution for itε , we get the following probability model: 
)'exp(1
)'exp()1(Pr 1,
iti
iti
ti
x
x
yob βα
βα
++
+
==+  
By using the panel structure of the data one can control for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that might bias results from cross-sectional analyses.  Here, the model will be 
estimated with two different specifications. The first is a pooled Logit model which takes the 
individual specific effect ai to be identical for all persons, therefore being a constant term. 
Second, a random effects Logit model will be used. Here, αi differs across individuals but is 
constant over time. It hence accounts for intrinsic differences in tastes to unpaid overtime 
work and in other unobserved explanatory variables. The individual specific effect αi is 
assumed to be randomly distributed across individuals and not to be correlated with the vector 
of covariates.  
 
In the first version of the model, we will estimate the probability of a layoff in the future, 
whereas in the second version, we use future promotion as the dependent variable. In a third 
version, we estimate the effect of unpaid overtime on the probability of a pay rise in the next 
period. For the first version of the model we expect a negative relationship between the 
amount of unpaid overtime hours and the probability of job loss, whereas in the second and 
the third version of the model we expect the relationship between unpaid overtime hours and 
the outcome variables to be negative. 
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5. Results  
The following tables show the pooled, and random effects Logit estimates of the amount of 
unpaid overtime and other working hours on the probability of pay rise, promotion and layoff. 
When the outcome variables are regressed on unpaid overtime hours and other exogenous 
variables, the control variables have the expected signs.4 The probability of layoff is 
negatively affected by tenure, working in the public sector, and increasing firm size in all the 
estimations, while there is a positive impact of a recent job change. Furthermore, the results 
show a negative effect of age and having a full-time partner for East German women who are 
at the same time more likely to be laid off if they have dependent children. In the estimations 
of the promotion probability, the coefficients on having children, having a full-time partner, 
work experience and holding a temporary job are mostly positive in all the estimations, while 
only West German women have a higher promotion probability if they work in a small firm. 
An increasing number of desired working hours leads to a higher probability of promotion 
except for the sub-sample of East German men, for whom this coefficient is significantly 
negative. Furthermore, the likelihood of promotion decreases with tenure, income, and when 
working in the public sector. The likelihood of a pay rise is positively influenced by the 
number of desired working hours, by having full-time working experience and with firm size, 
and it increases with tenure, age and education. There is a negative relationship between 
holding a temporary job and the probability of a wage increase. Furthermore, blue collar 
workers are less likely to get an increase in pay as well as married women. 
 
Table 4 shows pooled and random effects Logit estimates of the likelihood of being laid off in 
the next year (t+1), within the next two years (t+2), and within the next three years (t+3). In 
addition to the amount of unpaid overtime hours, other compensation forms of overtime, 
contractual hours and further control variables are included in all of the estimations.  
                                                        
4
 The coefficients are not reported here, but are available from the author on request. 
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Table 4: Working Hours and Future Layoffs: Pooled Logit and Random Effects Logit Coefficients  
 Pooled Logit Random Effects Pooled Logit Random Effects 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
West Germany 
 Men      Women      
Overtime             
  Unpaid 0.0214 0.0185 0.0041 0.0224 0.0698 0.2747 -0.0507 0.0509 -0.0035 -0.0507 2.3170 9.6274 
  Paid -0.1225* -0.0106 -0.0307 -0.1233 0.0343 -0.2702 0.0581 0.0527 0.0738 0.0581 0.4633 5.4803 
  Leisure 0.0315 0.0387 0.0263 0.0327 0.0934* 0.0775 -0.0534 0.0548 0.0502 -0.0534 2.7180 2.3796 
  Leis./paid -0.1785* -0.1139 -0.0548 -0.1784* -0.1065 0.2857 -0.1892 -0.0061 -0.0040 -0.1892 -4.8459 2.7314 
Contr. hours 0.0273 0.0363 0.0489 0.0278 0.0487 0.3732** 0.1028 -0.0067 -0.0116 0.1028 4.8572 1.5872 
East Germany 
 Men      Women      
Overtime             
  Unpaid 0.0800** 0.0448 0.0437 0.0853* 0.0614 0.3214 0.0080 -0.1142* -0.0652 0.0080 -5.1142 -3.4782 
  Paid -0.0383 -0.0242 -0.0234 -0.0417 -0.0817 0.0361 -0.0564 -0.0828 -0.0938 -0.0564 4.6348 5.4470 
  Leisure -0.0493 -0.0037 0.0018 -0.0497 0.0037 0.0930 0.0198 -0.0546 -0.0891 0.0198 -2.9946 -1.6771 
  Leis./paid -0.0134 -0.0179 -0.0248 -0.0138 -0.0393 0.1682 0.0544 -0.0775 -0.0455 0.0544 -4.0667 -4.9901 
Contr. hours 0.0529 -0.0027 0.0309 0.0493 -0.0298 0.2270* 0.0610 0.1029 0.0732 0.0610 -4.8458 3.6714 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002  
Sample: German full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note: The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics as well as year 
dummies. *significant at the 5% level, **significant at the 1% level 
 
 
Contrary to the expectations stated above, the unpaid overtime coefficient is positive for male 
workers in all estimations and hardly significant for most of the sub-samples. For female 
workers, unpaid overtime has a negative coefficient in some cases, and a statistically 
significant impact at the 5% level on the probability of layoff within the next two years in the 
estimations for East German women. In the estimations for male workers, the unpaid 
overtime coefficient is highly statistically significant, when estimating the probability of job 
loss in the following year, and it is robust in the random effects specification, which captures 
unobserved individual characteristics, as for example intrinsic differences in tastes to unpaid 
overtime work. In the estimations for West German male workers, paid and partially 
paid/partially leisure compensated overtime hours have a significantly negative impact on the 
job loss probability. The results suggest that unpaid extra hours do not prevent, but entail a 
layoff, and that other compensation forms of overtime work have more favorable 
consequences for workers who supply additional hours. 
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Table 5 presents Logit estimates of the likelihood of being promoted in the future with the 
amount of unpaid overtime hours as well as other working hours and control variables. In the 
estimation for males and East German females, the coefficient on unpaid overtime hours is 
positive. Furthermore, it is also statistically significant at the 5% level, when estimating the 
promotion probability within the next two years for East German women, while the effect is 
insignificant for all male workers. However, unpaid overtime is negative and statistically 
significant in the random effects estimation for West German women, when unobserved 
heterogeneity is controlled for. Hence, whereas for the sub-sample of East German women 
the estimates show the expected positive relationship between unpaid overtime and future 
promotion, the reverse is true for West German women. Other compensation forms of 
overtime seem to be important, which is especially true for West German male workers. The 
coefficients on leisure and partially paid/partially leisure compensated overtime have a much 
stronger and highly statistically significant positive impact on the probability of promotion.  
 
The estimates of the probability of a pay rise of 20% are shown in table 6 for East and West 
German men and women. The unpaid overtime coefficient is positive with the exception of 
some estimates for East German workers, which are, however, not significant. In the sub-
sample of West German women, unpaid overtime hours have a strong and highly statistically 
significant impact on the pay rise probability, which holds after controlling for unobserved 
worker heterogeneity in the random effects estimations. For East German women, the effect 
of unpaid overtime is only significant at the 5%, when estimating the pay rise within the 
following two years. There are no significant results of the unpaid overtime coefficient in the 
estimations for all male workers. However, male workers in East and West Germany have a 
higher probability of receiving a 20% higher wage within the next two years, when working 
paid overtime hours. In contrast, the pay rise probability is increased for female workers, 
when working partially paid/partially leisure compensated overtime. 
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Table 5: Working Hours and Future Promotion: Pooled Logit and Random Effects Logit Coefficients  
 Pooled Logit Random Effects Pooled Logit Random Effects 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
West Germany 
 Men      Women      
Overtime             
  Unpaid 0.0008 -0.0043 0.0076 0.0011 -0.0082 0.0133 -0.1220 -0.0865 -0.0726 -0.1220 -0.5892* -0.6803* 
  Paid 0.0070 0.0244 0.0654 0.0035 -0.0141 0.0810 -0.0377 -0.0305 -0.0710 -0.0377 -0.1208 -0.3070 
  Leisure 0.0659* 0.0449 0.0293 0.0693* -0.0494 -0.2081 0.0871 -0.0744 0.2242 0.0871 -0.2561 0.6716** 
  Leis./paid 0.1047** 0.0934** 0.1002** 0.1133** 0.0818 0.0239 0.0395 0.0028 0.0733 0.0395 0.3129* -0.2358 
Contr. hours 0.0586 0.0598 0.0109 0.0525 0.1160 0.2011 -0.0579 -0.0174 -0.1414 -0.0579 -0.6641 -1.3771* 
East Germany 
 Men      Women      
Overtime             
  Unpaid 0.0958 0.0960 0.0335 0.0975 2.5476 -1.0084 0.0782 0.3210* 0.3577 0.0782 0.3203* 5.0725 
  Paid 
-0.0387 0.0549 -0.0041 -0.0392 5.2720 -5.1765 -0.4145 0.1902 0.0614 -0.4145 0.1926 1.9376 
  Leisure 0.0201 0.1612* 0.0719 0.0184 3.0650 -9.7185 -0.0466 0.0961 0.3793** -0.0466 0.0965 5.1393 
  Leis./paid 0.0704 0.1902 -0.1689 0.0715 9.0235 -2.1039 0.0957 0.0900 0.1901 0.0957 0.0901 2.2819 
Contr. hours 
-0.0553 -0.0375 -0.1234 -0.0584 -4.6707 -7.4319 -0.1848 0.0270 0.2255 -0.1848 0.0329 4.6793 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002  
Sample: German full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note: The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics as well as year 
dummies. *significant at the 5% level, **significant at the 1% level 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Working Hours and Future Pay Rise (20%): Pooled Logit and Random Effects Logit Coefficients  
 Pooled Logit Random Effects Pooled Logit Random Effects 
 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 t+1 t+2 t+3 
West Germany 
 Men      Women      
Overtime             
  Unpaid 0.0164 0.0417 0.0093 0.0467 0.0164 0.0105 0.1091* 0.2202** 0.0242 0.2476** 0.1091** 0.0250 
  Paid 0.0723** 0.0489 0.0310 0.0511 0.0723** 0.0261 0.1178 0.0162 0.0482 0.0038 0.1178* 0.0436 
  Leisure 0.0412 0.0291 -0.0142 0.0336 0.0412 -0.0194 -0.0322 0.0791 -0.0787 0.0879 -0.0322 -0.1015 
  Leis./paid 0.0379 0.0477 0.0209 0.0468 0.0379 0.0165 -0.0172 0.0957* 0.0553 0.1174* -0.0172 0.0678 
Contr. hours 
-0.0574 -0.0002 -0.0317 0.0030 -0.0574* -0.0411 0.0079 -0.0229 -0.0294 -0.0320 0.0079 -0.0438 
East Germany 
 Men      Women  
    
Overtime 
            
  Unpaid 0.0166 0.0234 -0.0220 0.0483 0.0166 -0.0188 0.0797 -0.0712 -0.0998 -0.0855 0.0797* -0.1521 
  Paid 0.0139 0.0946** 0.0541 0.1068* 0.0139 0.0600 0.1187 0.1741* 0.1410 0.1682 0.1187 0.1139 
  Leisure 0.0279 -0.0190 -0.0271 -0.0248 0.0279 -0.0352 0.0423 -0.0216 -0.0691 -0.0272 0.0423 -0.0829 
  Leis./paid 0.0185 0.0610 0.0107 0.0762 0.0185 0.0220 0.0644 0.0326 -0.1682* 0.0462 0.0644 -0.4041 
Contr. hours 
-0.0359 -0.0820 -0.0554 -0.0797 -0.0359 -0.0795 -0.0699 -0.0457 0.1500 -0.0222 -0.0699 0.3250 
Source: GSOEP, 1991-2002  
Sample: German full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons excluded 
Note: The regression model is full-specified, independent variables include individual and job characteristics as well as year 
dummies. *significant at the 5% level, **significant at the 1% level 
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6. Conclusion  
The objective of our study is to analyze whether working hours can be interpreted as an 
investment. We raise the question as to what might lead workers to supply unpaid overtime 
hours, and what are the future consequences for these workers. Therefore, we investigate 
whether the supply of unpaid extra hours leads to higher future wages, to higher promotion 
probabilities and to a lower risk of losing the job. Using data from the GSOEP for the years 
1991 to 2002 we estimate a pooled and a random effects Logit model for East and West 
German male and female full-time employed workers.  
 
In our estimations we find that only for West German women unpaid overtime leads to 
positive wage effects, while the promotion probability is positively affected by unpaid 
overtime for East German women. Furthermore, unpaid overtime hours does not have the 
expected negative impact on the likelihood of being laid off. On the contrary, the unpaid 
overtime coefficient is found to be significantly positive in the estimations for East German 
men. At the same time the coefficients of the other forms of working hours are found to be 
equally important for the determination of the probability of future payoffs, as a positive 
impact of paid and with leisure compensated overtime hours is found for the probability of 
promotion and wage increase. In addition, the influence of other variables used as controls, 
eg. the amount of desired working hours, on future payoffs is found to be much greater. We 
conclude that there is only partial empirical evidence for a positive relationship between 
unpaid overtime work and future benefits. Working unpaid extra hours leads only to a slightly 
higher probability of promotion and pay rise and does not help to prevent a future layoff.  
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Appendix  
Table A1: Description and Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Regression Model 
Variable  Description Mean (SD) 
 Dependent variables Men Women 
LnWage Log hourly compensation rate (gross earnings) 3.24 (0.48) 2.99 (0.44) 
Promo Promotion: 1= being promoted, else=0 0.09 0.10 
Layoff Layoff: 1= being laid off, else=0 0.02 0.02 
    
 Overtime variable   
Unpaidovh Unpaid overtime hours per week 0.79 (2.86) 0.53 (2.16) 
    
 Socio-demographic variables   
Age Age in years 40.18 (10.36) 38.05 (10.57) 
Married Marital status: 1 = married couple, else = 0 0.70 0,57 
Partner Partner is full-time employed: 1=yes, else=0 0.45 0.50 
Child Dependent children (up to 16 years old): 1= yes, no=0 0.45 0.30 
    
 Education and work experience   
Edu Length of education in years 12.23 (2.50) 12.22 (2.28) 
Tenure  Work experience at the same employer in years (seniority) 10.44 (9.90) 8.14 (8.18) 
Expfull  Previous work experience as full-time employee in years 18.43 (10.92) 14.39 (9.82) 
Exppart Previous work experience as part-time employee in years 0.34 (1.17) 1.73 (3.78) 
    
 Job characteristics   
Public Work in the public sector: 1=yes, else=0 0.15 0.33 
Change Change of job: 1=yes, else=0 0.14 0.16 
Tempjob Temporary job: 1=yes, else=0 0.04 0.06 
 23
Job0 No training necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0;  
Reference category 0.02 0.03 
Job1 Briefing or courses necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0 0.24 0.22 
Job2 Vocational training necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0 0.54 0.59 
Job3 College/University necessary for the job: 1=yes, else=0 0.14 0.08 
Occ0 Occupation: 1=all others, else=0; Reference category 0.01 0.03 
Occ1 Occupation: 1=Managers, else=0 0.05 0.03 
Occ2 Occupation: 1=Professionals, else=0 0.13 0.10 
Occ3 Occupation: 1=Technicians, else=0 0.16 0.34 
Occ4 Occupation: 1=Clerks, else=0 0.09 0.23 
Occ5 Occupation: 1=Service/Sales, else=0 0.03 0.15 
Occ6 Occupation: 1=Craft workers, else=0 0.33 0.05 
Occ7 Occupation: 1=Plant/Machine, else=0 0.13 0.03 
Occ8 Occupation: 1=Elementary, else=0 0.06 0.05 
Bluecol Blue collar worker=1, else=0 0.45 0.16 
Bluecol0 Blue collar worker: 1=unskilled, else=0; Reference category 0.01 0.02 
Bluecol1 Blue collar worker: 1=skilled, else=0 0.10 0.07 
Bluecol2 Blue collar worker: 1=semiskilled, else=0 0.27 0.07 
Bluecol3 Blue collar worker: 1=foreman, else=0 0.05 0.00 
Bluecol4 Blue collar worker: 1=master, else=0 0.02 0.00 
Whiteco0 White collar worker: 1=foreman, else=0; Reference category 0.02 0.00 
Whiteco1 White collar worker: 1=without vocational training, else=0 0.02 0.05 
Whiteco2 White collar worker: 1=with vocational training, else=0 0.03 0.14 
Whiteco3 White collar worker: 1=qualified occupation, else=0  0.14 0.43 
Whiteco4 White collar worker: 1=highly qualified occupation, else=0 0.18 0.11 
Whiteco5 White collar worker: 1=executive function, else=0 0.02 0.01 
    
 Industry (Reference category: all other branches)    
Branch1 Branch: 1=Energy/Water, else=0 0.01 0.00 
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Branch2 Branch: 1=Chemicals, else=0 0.01 0.02 
Branch3 Branch: 1=Plastics, else=0 0.02 0.02 
Branch4 Branch: 1=Stone, else=0 0.06 0.04 
Branch5 Branch: 1=Metal, else=0 0.08 0.03 
Branch6 Branch: 1=Wood, else=0 0.13 0.05 
Branch7 Branch: 1=Textiles, else=0 0.02 0.01 
Branch8 Branch: 1=Food, else=0 0.15 0.02 
Branch9 Branch: 1=Construction, else=0 0.11 0.16 
Branch10 Branch: 1=Wholesale/Retail, else=0 0.01 0.03 
Branch11 Branch: 1=Transport, else=0 0.08 0.04 
Branch12 Branch: 1=Banking/Insurance, else=0 0.04 0.07 
Branch13 Branch: 1=Other services, else=0 0.03 0.18 
Branch14 Branch: 1=Non-Profit, else=0 0.11 0.23 
    
 Firm size    
Size1 Firm size < 5 employees 0.21 0.21 
Size2 Firm size > 5 and <20  employees 0.06 0.07 
Size3 Firm size > 20 and < 200 employees 0.03 0.03 
Size4 Firm size > 200 and < 2000 employees 0.02 0.02 
Size0 Firm size > 2000 employees; Reference category 0.12 0.12 
    
U_State Regional unemployment rate at the state level 9.01 (2.51) 16.36 (2.88) 
U_District Regional unemployment rate at the district level 9.51 (2.80) 17.24(2.79) 
    
Source: GSOEP, 1991–2002 (own calculations) 
Sample: German male and female full-time employees, age 20-65, civil servants and self-employed persons 
excluded 
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